May 5, 2021 | Current US-China Narratives
While the news cycle is slow, it can be too easy to get caught up in sensationalism
Secretary of State Antony Blinken expressed the US has no intention of inflaming a Cold War with China, and rationally speaking, he appears to be sincere. Despite four years of Trump's rhetoric, it’s unclear what the United States stands to gain from such a confrontation.
The challenge for the Biden administration is leveraging the growing competitive dynamics exposed by a rising China to further American interests.
China is not the omnipotent threat the trump administration, pundits, and media have made it out to be. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is currently in the middle of a massive state-building drive to lift China into the 21st century and is still decades away from even considering supplanting the United States as the world’s dominant power.
The United States’ core areas of strength are also areas where China cannot compete yet, namely: 1) military, 2) global finance, 3) semiconductors. These are also the US strengths China fears most. Thereby China is actively working to distance itself from US influence by seeking ways to internationalize its currency, the Yuan to compete with the dollar, and building out its own advanced semiconductor sector to reduce dependence on US chips.
The core challenge for China will be finding a way to maximize the benefits of global trade and integration with the rest of the world while also seeking ways to be as self-sufficient as possible. It’s hard to discern a path forward for China to achieve this, but then again few predicted China would achieve the level of global influence it currently holds.
Some may disagree, but the Biden administration doesn’t appear to have an actual China policy yet. Since January, Biden’s main focus has been primarily domestic. Unlike during the Trump administration, the primary role of China as a concept within the public imagination is to serve as an external threat used to justify domestic reforms.
Overall, US-China relations are in “strategic patience mode.” This has had the effect of limiting inflammatory China rhetoric from the wider US public discourse and has reduced the reactive bite of China’s Wolf Warriors.
So now that the news cycle around China is slowing, we suddenly see much more focus on Taiwan. However, so far, there’s little evidence an invasion from the Mainland is imminent.
Overall, US-China discourse under Biden is gradually becoming more sober and nuanced. Despite some headlines claiming the world is on the cusp of a global conflict centered around Taiwan, US-China relations are clearly far more stable than they were six to twelve months ago. Moving forward, it’s best not to be enamored by headlines and, as always, maintain a focus on both the United States and China’s fixed constraints.
Current Events and Additional Reading
Taiwan
Strategic clarity on Taiwan policy carries 'significant downsides' - U.S.
The U.S. policy coordinator for the Indo-Pacific on Tuesday appeared to reject calls for the United States to make a clear statement of its willingness to defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack, saying there were "significant downsides" to such an approach.
Kurt Campbell told a discussion hosted by the Financial Times it was appropriate to be concerned about the situation over Taiwan, the self-ruled democratic island that has come under mounting military pressure from China, which considers it a renegade province.
US is misleading in its assessment of China’s Taiwan threat
Warnings over the risk of war in the Taiwan Strait have reached fever pitch. Admiral Philip Davidson, then commander of US forces in the Pacific, told US senators in March that the threat of a Chinese attack on Taiwan “is manifest during this decade, in fact in the next six years”. The Economist last week described Taiwan as “the most dangerous place on earth”. It is time to take a step back and ponder the fact that much of the anxiety has arisen from the misinterpretation of one Chinese Communist party document. According to US defence officials, a key reason behind Davidson’s prediction is the Chinese Communist party’s talk of a new interim goal, in 2027, for developing the People’s Liberation Army. A US defence official calls it “a new interim milestone for PLA modernisation”, asserting that this is “an eight year acceleration from 2035”.
US-China
US-China tech war: Beijing's secret chipmaking champions (Nikkei)
Every U.S. market leader in the computer chip industry now has a Chinese doppelganger that is being positioned to take its place as a vendor to the Chinese chip industry. YMTC, for example, is strikingly similar in its approach and strategy to Boise, Idaho-based Micron, while Beijing-based Naura Technology Group represents China's hope to later challenge Applied Materials, which is headquartered in Santa Clara, California, and makes a wide range of chip production equipment.
3 Reasons Why the US Doesn’t Have a Coherent China Strategy (The Diplomat)
Although in the last five or six years there seems to have emerged a so-called new consensus on China within the United States, particularly following the 2017 Trump administration’s National Security Strategy report, in reality there are still major disagreements with regard to how to define China, how to compete with or confront China, and what issues should be prioritized. Perhaps the only consensus among the various U.S. institutions is to “get tough on China,” even though what exactly the term “tough” means is very unclear.
The ‘Strategic Competition Act’ is a dangerous declaration of cold war on China
This is the first installment in a multi-part Quincy Institute series on the Strategic Competition Act (S. 1169), a bill under consideration that would effectively constitute a declaration of cold war on China by the U.S. Congress. We begin with an overview of the bill’s framing of the threat China poses to the United States and other nations and what to do about it. It will be followed by separate essays delving into greater detail analyzing the inaccurate assessments and policy changes suggested in several critical areas: Taiwan, the South China Sea maritime disputes, North Korea, educational exchanges, influence operations, and the Belt and Road Initiative.
Western companies in China succumb to Stockholm syndrome
Warnings over the risk of war in the Taiwan Strait have reached fever pitch. Admiral Philip Davidson, then commander of US forces in the Pacific, told US senators in March that the threat of a Chinese attack on Taiwan “is manifest during this decade, in fact in the next six years”. The Economist last week described Taiwan as “the most dangerous place on earth”. It is time to take a step back and ponder the fact that much of the anxiety has arisen from the misinterpretation of one Chinese Communist party document. According to US defence officials, a key reason behind Davidson’s prediction is the Chinese Communist party’s talk of a new interim goal, in 2027, for developing the People’s Liberation Army. A US defence official calls it “a new interim milestone for PLA modernisation”, asserting that this is “an eight year acceleration from 2035”.
Photo by Freeman Zhou on Unsplash